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Abstract: We examine whether economic downturns reshape the distribution of population income 
giving rise to a “middle-class squeeze.” We test this hypothesis using alternative definitions of 
middle-class, such as income-based measures from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), and 
perceived measures from the Integrated Values Study (IVS). Our findings suggest that, although 
recessions do not produce a middle-class squeeze overall, the unanticipated shocks resulting from 
the Great Recession did. Furthermore, we find that recessions increase the share of the population 
that regards itself as ‘middle-class.’ Estimates are heterogeneous to the baseline unemployment at 
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1 Introduction 
There is ample agreement in the literature that a sizeable middle-class protects against 
socioeconomic and political instability. For instance, support for democracy is more likely to 
endure in countries with a relatively large middle-class size (Barro, 1999). Similarly, countries 
with a larger middle-class are more likely to boost innovation, entrepreneurship and 
productivity (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997) by stimulating human capital accumulation (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1996, Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005) and upward mobility (Easterly, 2001)2 alongside 
reducing so-called ‘latent class conflicts’ (Thurow, 1984). 
 
There is some evidence suggesting a ‘flattening out’ of the middle-class (Kroll, 2011), but 
so far findings are not robust, let alone the identification of the underlying mechanisms behind 
it. Among the potentially exogenous determinants, macroeconomic conditions are on top of the 
list (Pressman, 2007). Unexpected ‘economic shocks’ - such as those associated with the Great 
Recession - can be argued to lead to a so-called ‘middle-class squeeze.’ The latter in particular 
has received limited consideration in the academic literature, this contrasting the frequent 
media attention on middle-class squeezing, especially during the last decade and starting from 
the Great Recession. 
 
This paper examines the effect of employment shocks, namely an employment change 
during a recession which was not anticipated, on both the share of income of the middle-class 
and its size3. Also, we contribute to this question by examining the specific effect of the Great 
                                                 
2 However, this might differ between developed and developing countries. Banerjee and Duflo (2008) finds that what 
characterizes the middle-class in developing countries setting is primary having stable employment. 
3 According to the permanent income hypothesis, the effect of an unemployment shock on income and consumption is 
larger when is not anticipated. Christelis et al (2015) argues that this most likely the case for those who became unemployed 
after the Great Recession. 
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Recession, and to whether the so-called ‘middle-class squeeze’ is heterogeneous depending on 
the specific middle-class measure adopted. We also test if countries’ social spending protects 
against adverse income shocks from unemployment during recessions through unemployment 
insurance and welfare benefits spending. 
 
A recessionary period is defined as at least two consecutive quarters of negative quarter-
on-quarter growth in seasonally adjusted real GDP 4 . Likewise, we distinguish the effect of 
substantial recessionary periods from the rest. The Great Recession, which was triggered in 
2007 by the US subprime mortgage crisis, was the worst global recession since World War II, 
and it was mostly unanticipated (Christelis et al., 2015). It started in December 2007 in the U.S. 
and ended there in June 2009. However, only during 2009, the world economy was in a state of 
the global recession with an overall decline of the World GDP per capita5. 
 
In western countries, the income effects of economic shocks can be accommodated both 
via wage bargaining and labor regulations and, partially insured through unemployment 
subsidies, social benefits, and subsidized public services (Dallinguer, 2013). Similarly, we also 
examine whether the effect of an economic recession is likely to depend on the duration and 
depth of recessions. That is, while short lasting recessions might have negligible effects and can 
be easily accommodated by credit mechanisms counteracting liquidity constraints; credit 
mechanisms might not persist when recessions are long-lasting. However, some recessions give 
rise to specific policy interventions such as austerity cuts which reduce the potential 
accommodating effect of employment insurance, as it was in the case of the Great Recession. 
                                                 
4 A discussion about the pros and cons of such definition can be found in (Keegan et al., 2013) 
5 In addition, the Great Recession led to a sharp decline in international trade, a rapid rise in unemployment in 
many countries, and slumping prices for many commodities. 
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Hence, the magnitude of the hypothetical squeeze of the middle-classes after a recession largely 
depends on both the nature of a recession as well as on the institutions put in place to 
accommodate its impact. 
 
An essential question, when documenting the effect of a recession on the size of the 
middle-class, lies in its measurement. Generally speaking, middle-class measures are divided 
between those grounded on income or consumption measures (e.g., defined by an income cut-
off point relative to a poverty measure, or to the income distribution in a given population) and 
those based on broader social definitions; these involve occupational or class status, and income 
self-perception. Both definitions capture different features of what we mean by ‘middle-class’ 
(Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013). Unsurprisingly, sociological definitions, which reflect 
individual identity as middle-class, are generally more stable measures of occupational or self-
perceived status, while income-based definitions are typically time-varying and heterogeneous 
depending on the income’s definition adopted. In this paper, and by accessing the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) data, we can distinguish between overall disposable income, labor income, 
and market income, and explore if and how our estimates change depending on income 
definition. Indeed, we empirically document whether a recession with a deep and lasting effect 
might exert an influence on middle-class size irrespective of different definitions. We take 
advantage of several income and social-based definitions of middle-class measures. Together 
with the data from LIS, we construct variables to measure middle-class self-perception by jointly 
using the World Value Survey (longitudinal files covering Waves 1 to 6 for the  1981-2014 
period) and the European Values Study (longitudinal data covering waves 1 to 4 for the period 
1981 – 2008), referred henceforth as integrated Values Study (IVS). 
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We do not find evidence of a ‘middle-class squeeze’ resulting from an unexpected 
employment shock, namely an economic recession interacted with the unemployment rate. 
However, when we explore the effect of a largely unanticipated shock such as the Great 
Recession, we find evidence of squeezing, but only on labor income. This is robust to alternative 
specifications controlling for the depth and duration of the recessions. Nonetheless, the effect is 
heterogeneous across income based middle-class definitions. Importantly, we find a larger share 
of the population regarding itself as a middle-class after a recession. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section is a summary background discussion 
about middle-class and recession measurement issues. Section three contains a description of 
the data and methods employed. Section four reports the study’s results, and a final section 
concludes. 
 
2 Measuring the size of the middle-class  
Defining the middle-class is not a straightforward task. Middle-class is a multi-dimensional 
concept, identifiable from individual-based consumption, income, and wealth data. There is no 
consensus, however, on its definition (Casehll, 2007). The US Census Bureau publishes figures 
breaking down the income distribution into quintiles, and defines the middle-class’ based on 
choosing a set of quintiles in the middle of the distribution. However, it is possible to employ a 
number of different definitions. 
 
2.1 Income-based approaches: (i) inequality  and (ii) size 
To measure income-based middle-class, we use the LIS dataset. We can summarize income-
based criteria in two main categories: (i) inequality-based and (ii) size-based measures 
5 
(Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013). 
 
2.1.1 Inequality-based measures 
The first set of middle-class’s measures we consider are those based on fixing first a middle 
section of the income distribution as the one qualifying the middle-class and then calculating the 
share of total income owned by the predefined section. We call them inequality-based measures. 
Regarding the first step, we measure the percent income held by the population (i) in the third 
quintile and (ii) in the second to the fourth quintile of the income distribution. In doing so, we 
follow, for example, Easterly (2001), who considers the income share of the three middle 
quintiles (leaving out the poorest 20% and the wealthiest 20%).6 
 
2.1.2 Size-based measures 
Size-based measures invert the methodology outlined above by fixing first a threshold around 
an average or median statistic of the population’s distribution and then proceed by calculating 
the percentage population contained within the pre-determined threshold. This has been done, 
for example, by Pressman (2007) who adopts a uniform definition of middle-class as households 
receiving between 75% and 125% of median household income, adjusted for family 
composition, and which has been used to study the income evolution over time in several 
countries and by using the LIS database as we do here. As suggested in Atkinson and Brandolini 
(2013), we also refer to an alternative middle-class’ size for robustness, as the percentage of the 
population between 60 %and 250% of the median income.7 
                                                 
6 Solimano (2008) defines even a broader middle-class, one comprising individuals belonging to deciles 3 to 9. 
7 There are also methodologies to define middle-class for developing countries. See, for example Ferreira (2013), Lopez-




2.2 Sociological approaches 
To measure self-perception of belonging to the middle-class, we use the IVS individual survey 
data and build country-level measures of middle-class self-perception. One can define the 
middle-class drawing on sociologically based definitions which typically refer to either 
functional structure (Goldthrope 1987) or self-reported class and income group. However, the 
former is more stable over time, while the latter is more likely to vary if individuals update their 
perceptions with information on their actual income. 
 
Ferreira et al. (2003), adopted a subjective approach, based on self-reported class 
membership. This is derived by tracing the lower threshold as the lowest income level where 
most people regard themselves as members of the middle-class. The lowest income threshold, 
where most people identify themselves as middle-class, was similar to the one offered in Lopez-
Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011), a paper that used the probability of vulnerability to poverty, an 
approach which allowed to set the level at $10 per day per capita. However, the self-reported 
class structure is influenced by the perceived income distribution in the country, which might 
be culture-specific and hence limits its use for cross-country comparisons.  Belonging to the 
middle-class is an appealing idea to which individuals wish to belong to, and might classify 
themselves in such a way depending on the presence of welfare states, protective labor market 
regulations, access to public health, education, and housing. 
 
Overall, and despite the extensive literature on the middle-class size and its 
socioeconomic effects, the evidence evaluating the impact that recessions had on middle-class 
size is skinny. This paper attempts to fill this gap, especially considering the unusual depth of the 
recession cycle started in 2007, a unique event since WWII. Our results suggest two main 
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findings. First, recessions have a negative, but rarely significant, direct effect on middle-class’ 
size. Second, the effect of the Great Recession has been large and significant, suggesting the 
unique nature of the latest recession in squeezing middle-class’ wealth in the Western world. 
 
3 Data and empirical strategy 
This section describes the data and the methodology employed. Our dependent variable 
considers several different definitions of middle-class size. 
 
3.1 Middle-class measures from LIS data 
We exploit inequality and size-based middle-class measures by using income distributions from 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) household database, referring to the 1980-2013 period. Our 
sample draws initially from 197 micro-data sets, but we include only countries with more than 
5 LIS datasets. The sample size is then extended to 405 country-level observations by applying 
linear interpolations for missing observations between years of a given country. Details on the 
middle-class and income measures used are provided in the three following subsections. 
 
3.1.1 LIS: “inequality-based” measures of middle-class 
We first constructed commonly used definitions based on whether individuals’ incomes fall (i) 
between the 2nd and fourth quintile (2to4) or (ii) within the 3rd quintile of the income distribution 
(3). For simplicity, we refer to these measures as being inequality-based. More specifically, we 
measure middle-class as the percentage of income within the second to fourth quintile of the 
population’s income distribution. Similarly, we measure middle-class’ inequality using only the 
income shares within the third quintile of the income distribution. The thresholds are chosen by 
referring to the previous literature and mentioned in the introductory section of the paper. 
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3.1.2 LIS: ‘size-based” measures of middle-class 
Second, we measure middle-class “size” in term of the proportion of the observations 
(population-weighted) of the sample within predetermined income brackets. In particular, we 
determine the income bracket using median income as a reference. We then calculate a “small-
size” (S) measure as the percentage of population within 75% and 125% of the median income. 
We then use the same methodology to calculate “big-size” (B), reporting the percentage within 
60% and 250% of the median income. Although upper bounds are more challenging to identify, 
the lower limits, 75% or 60% of the median income, find quite a common agreement as threshold 
points between middle-class and poverty (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013). 
 
3.1.3 LIS: income types and normalization criteria 
Given the importance of measuring the effects of different sources of income, we take advantage 
of the high-quality, and fine-grained information provided by LIS, which enables us to (i) use 
different types of income and (ii) using alternative equalization factors for household’s size.8 
 
First, we use three measures of income types throughout the paper, which we obtained 
by following the LIS guidelines.9 
 
1. Labor income (HIL), directly available from LIS. 
2. Market income (MI), derived as: 
 
                                                 
8 We also extrapolated definitions based on population’s segments according to age classes. We do not report such results, 
as they do not add much to the evidence obtained by using the whole population. 
9 To avoid unnecessary complications, variables’ names throughout follow LIS labelling methodology. 
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market income (mi) = factor income (hic + hil) + hitp 
 
where hic means income from capital, and hitp are private transfers. These last 
two are directly available from LIS. 
3. Disposable income (DHI), calculated as: 
dhi = mi (hil + hic+ hitp) + hitsi + hitsu -hxit + hitsa 
 where: hitsi are transfers from social insurance, hitsu are transfers from 
universal benefits; hitsa represent transfers for social assistance; finally, hxit 
are tax payments. Again, all of these directly available from LIS. 
 
Second, we define the variables depending on income measured at: 
 
1. the household level (RAW), per household component 
2. by dividing by full household size (PC) 
3. by only partially counting household’s size and using the parameter 0.5 10  as 
equivalizing factor (EQ) for household’s size.11 
 
  
                                                 
10 0.5 being the factor suggested in LIS guidelines. 
11 All measures were obtained also by (i) applying top-bottom coding - greater than zero, and less or equal ten times 
the median value of the distribution - to the income data, and by (ii) using the observations’ appropriate population 
weights to report to one country’s population in adherence with the LIS guidelines. It is worth noting; pension 
payments are excluded in all measures. 
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3.2 Measures of self-reporting and class self-perception from IVS 
 
Another source of microdata, which allows building middle-class measures, are from the 
Integrated Values Study (IVS). IVS is obtained by merging the World Value Survey (WVS) and 
the European Values Study (EVS). The first variable employed, available both from the WVS and 
EVS, is variable X047 “Scales of Incomes” asking the respondents to self-classify themselves into 
a deciles-scale from one (lowest step) to ten (highest). In this way, and taking into account the 
problems stemming from self-classification, we compute the percentage of respondents by a 
country that self-classify within the third quintile, or the second to fourth quintile of the income 
distribution. This measure is consistent with a subjective size-based measure of middle-class, 
though we had to adopt a different methodology than in LIS, because we do not have measures 
of median income in this case. In doing this, we obtain 307 measures for countries and different 
years, interpolating the missing ones according to the LIS sample, and building 405 country-year 
observations. 
 
A second strategy has been utilizing variable X045 “Social Class Subjective,” a variable 
spanning from value 1 “Belonging to the upper class,” to 5 “Lower Class.” In this case, we build 
two measures of the middle-class. The first considers only the percentage of respondents self-
classifying as “Upper Middle-class,” and another summing the percentages of those self-
classifying both as “Upper Middle-class” and “Lower Middle-class.” Here, we ended up with only 
207 country aggregates because this question is available in WVS but not in EVS, and again, 
reported to the 405 observations sample through linear interpolation. 
 
3.3 Measures of recessions 
To measure fluctuations in unemployment directly associated with the Great Recession we 
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follow Keegan al. (2013) and quantify the unemployment change in the recessionary period 
2007- 2009. The identification of a recession is computed from quarterly growth-rates of 
seasonally adjusted GDP from the OECD dataset to create the recession and recession’s derived 
variables. In particular, rates are calculated by following the GPSA method, i.e., the quarter-to-
quarter growth-rate method. 
 
Following the official definition, a recession is identified from a dummy variable which 
equals to 1 if country i in year j experienced two or more consecutive quarters of negative 
growth. From the recession variable, we computed categorical variables for: 
 
1. Depth (DE): this was first calculated as the absolute value of the average negative 
growth rate of the recessive wave. This variable was then codified in three 
categories depending on the growth rate being between 0 and 2.5, 2.5 and 5, and 
above 5. 
 
2. Duration (DU): this measures the number of consecutive quarters of negative 
growth. This variable was then codified in five categories depending on the 
growth rate belonging to the intervals (0,1], (1,4], (4,7], (7,10], and strictly above 
ten quarters. 
 
We also created a dummy variable Great Recession (GR), a dummy capturing the period 
2006-2008 as the onset of the Great Recession. This variable, interacted with the recession 
dummy, helps in singling out all recessions happened within the Great Recession wave. 
  
12 
3.4 Control variables 
Given that other alternative effects can influence the size of the middle class, we consider some 
control variables. More specifically, we control for per capita GDP (PcGDP) given that the size of 
the middle class might be a normal good increasing with a country’s wealth. Higher average-
income countries have more resources available to invest in institutions and welfare programs 
that reduce inequality. Indeed, some work shows evidence of a negative association between 
changes in Gini and median income (Thewissen et al., 2018).  Some demographic characteristics 
as the population size (POP) are found to correlate negatively with inequality (Campante and 
Do, 2007). The percentage of the female population (F) also has been found to influence 
inequality, both from a lower propensity to being in the labor market, as well as different 
attitudes towards inequality. Other covariates include also the percentage of labor force owning 
a secondary and tertiary degree concerning the overall population (EDU), which captures the 
effect of human capital on being middle-class, though the evidence on the impact on inequality 
is not well established, and it depends on the return to education (Goldin and Katz, 2007). 
Finally, the age dependency ratio (ADR) captures the share of the population active in the labor 
market who produce income. All these controls could provide independent explanations for a 
change in the size of the middle-class, and have the potential to control for omitted variable bias 
in our estimates. 
 
[Insert Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics - about here] 
 
4 Empirical strategy 
We draw on the country and year specific variation in middle-class size as our baseline linear 
specification, which makes up of a panel of OECD countries.  
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4.1 Baseline estimates 
In our baseline model, the independent variable(s) is (are)  𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑗
defined as middle-class’ 
measure j in country i at time t , and regressed on the unemployment rate variable 𝑈𝑖𝑡, on the 
recession dummy 𝑅𝑖𝑡, and on their interaction, 𝑈𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝑖𝑡. Equations 1.1 to 1.3 show, respectively, 
the use of the recession dummy (equal to 1 if there has been at least one recessive quarter during 
the year), and of the categorical variable measuring duration (variable 𝐷𝑈 in specification 1.2) 
and depth (variable 𝐷𝐸  in specification 1.2) of the recession whose definitions have been 




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈 ×  𝑅)𝑖𝑡+𝚽′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.1) 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑗
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈 ×  𝐷𝑈)𝑖𝑡+𝚽′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.2) 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑗
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈 ×  𝐷𝐸)𝑖𝑡+𝚽′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1.3) 
 
The term 𝚽′𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector including the set of control variables described in the previous 
section; finally, 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 are, respectively, country and year dummies. Throughout the paper we 
use robust standard error estimation. 
 
[Insert Table 2 – Baselines - about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the results for specifications 1.1 to 1.3, where we use different definitions 
of middle-class and income from the LIS data. For space reasons, we omit the reporting of the 
coefficient obtained for the control variables. We first consider the definition of middle-class as 
the percentage of income within the second to fourth quintile of its distribution. In particular, 
the panel A reports a set of nine results where the first three columns draw on the raw definition 
of disposable household income (DHIRAW) the following three on equivalised income (DHIEQ), 
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and the remaining on per-capita income (DHIPC) respectively. As in column (1), the estimated 
coefficient of unemployment 𝑈 on the middle-class’ size is -0.16 (significant at the 1% level) 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in unemployment is associated with a reduction 
of -0.16% of income accruing to the middle-class. Estimates for the recession dummy 𝑅 and the 
interaction variable obtained by interacting recessions with unemployment rate, variable 𝑈 × 𝑅, 
are instead not significant. We thus find that, while recessions do not seem to be significantly 
associated with middle-class size, when shifting from the raw definition of disposable household 
income to the equivalised (column 2) and the per-capita (column 2 ones), we still obtain a 
negative and 1% significant negative association between unemployment and middle-class. It is 
important to note that the size for the equivalised version is reduced (from 0.16 to 0.09) and 
instead magnified when using the per-capita version (from 0.16 to 0.19). Another important 
difference between the regression in column (1), and those in columns 2 and 3, is that the 
interaction 𝑈 × 𝑅 becomes larger and significant at 5% level in column 2 and 1% level in column 
(3). In particular, the estimated coefficient of 0.02 in column 1 increases to 0.06 in column 2 and 
0.16 in column 3. One way to read this positive interaction is that the negative effect of 
unemployment on middle-class’ tends to be weaker in years when recessions hit, likely for the 
more or less automatic enactment of social stabilizers. Table 3 explores this possible mechanism 
further by making use of social protection spending data. 
 
Columns 3 to 6 consider labor income (HIL) instead of disposable income (DHI). Here, 
we record a strikingly stronger and highly significant and negative association of unemployment 
on middle-class’, size which goes, respectively, from -0.16 to -0.6 for the raw definition of income, 
from -.0.09 to -0.61 for the equivalised version, and from -0.19 to -0.51 when the average 
household’s member income is considered. As these results might seem intuitive, it is worth 
noting that, to our knowledge, empirical evidence of this type was not provided in previous 
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literature, as only drawing from LIS data allowed us to test this stark difference between 
disposable and labor income. Clearly, this shows that is not a general middle-class squeezing 
effect from unemployment that is predominant, but one where middle-class status has been 
reached mainly through labor income. 
 
The last three columns report the same set of specifications when market income (MI) is 
considered. The result is an almost equivalent reversal of what found when using labor income 
definition in that we assist to estimates’ shift from -0.60 to 0.62 for RAW measures, -0.61 to 0.62 
for the specification using the EQ measure, and -0.51 to 0.53 when the PC definition is used. 
Results in panel A seems to be qualitatively equivalent and robust also in panel B (columns 10 
to 18), where we shift from a definition of percentage income within the second to the fourth 
quintile to one considering only the percentage in the third quintile of the income distribution. 
However, in this case, the negative association of unemployment seems to be weaker in size 
when considering DHI and HIL incomes, as well as for the smaller and positive association with 
MI. 
 
Panel C reports six additional specifications (columns 19 to 24) where the middle-class 
is measured as the percentage of the population that falls in two different income brackets. For 
space reasons, we show only the results for the EQ version of household income. Column 19, for 
example, reports the results obtained when using the EQ definition of DHI when recurring to the 
broader definition of middle-class. We recall, ‘large’ indicates that we set the brackets as 
between 60% and 250% of the median income of the distribution. In contrast, ‘small’ indicates 
brackets between 75% and 125%. For these panels, results are quite different from those 
obtained in A and B. First of all, unemployment has a positive effect on the percentage of people 
in the pre-designed brackets. This is especially evident and highly significant when considering 
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column 19, where the positive association between 𝑈  and the DHIEQ (Large) definition of 
middle-class is 0.6 (1% significant). This indicates that one more percentage point of 
unemployment is associated to a increase of 0.6% persons in the middle-class. The only 
exception to this common trend is column 22, where unemployment is negatively associated 
with HILEQ (Small). Overall, the results obtained when utilizing this definition of middle-class’ 
size seem to be less convincing, both for lack of significance and consistency of the results across 
several specifications. Part of the reason can be based on the fact that, when the percentage of 
the sample within a predefined income bracket is utilized, there may be counterbalancing effects 
as people being in the middle-class falling far below the median and thus outside the bracket, 
are accompanied by people falling at the same time from the upper class to the middle, resulting 
in an undecided effect on the percentage. 
 
We finally turn to panel D of Table 2, showing results obtained when using middle-class’ 
measures from IVS. As explained before in the data section, we have two different measures. One 
(MCPPERC and MCPERC2) is constructed by looking at how respondents classify themselves as 
belonging to an upper class, upper middle-class, middle-class, lower middle-class, and working 
class. For robustness, we report two different measures, one including lower-middle-class and 
one excluding a respondent who self-located into a lower-middle-class outside the calculation of 
the percentage respondents self-locating into the middle-class. Another measure MCSLS3 and 
MCSL2to4 recurs to self-location in income deciles and computing the percentage respondents 
into the derived quintiles. Results are like the ones obtained when using the income percentages 
definitions, with negative association of 𝑈 and positive association with the interaction 𝑈 × 𝑅12. 
                                                 
12However, the interpretation of these results cannot be the same in that the middle-class measures obtained by 
using the IVS data count the percentage respondents identifying themselves as middle-class, and are thus more 




4.2 The effect of the Great Recession 
We then consider the middle-class’ effects experienced by countries within the onsetting wave 
of the Great Recession. That is, we created a dummy variable equal to one for the years between 
2006 and 2008 to capture the differential effects of those recessions occurred at the onset of the 
Great Recession (GR). This is done by creating an interaction variable, 𝐺𝑅 × 𝑅. 
 
We also extend to the full set of double interactions by including the interaction 𝐺𝑅 × 𝑈, 
capturing the differential effect of unemployment at the onset of the Great Recession. The new 
specification that we test is shown in equation 2 below. As we did for the baselines, all 
regressions are also run by using the categorical variables measuring depth (𝐷𝐸) and duration 
(𝐷𝑈) of recessions. As in the baselines, we do not report the results obtained by using duration 
and depth, which are consistent with what found when using the simple recessive dummy. For 
space reasons this time we also only report the results using the equivalised measures of income 
while the full set of results which we make available and not for publication in a related appendix 
to this paper, show similar trends than the ones displayed in Table 1. 
 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈 ×  𝑅)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐺𝑅 ×  𝑈) + 𝛽5(𝐺𝑅 ×  𝑅) 
+𝚽′𝑿 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(2) 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The results in Table 3, panels A and B, show that most of the dynamics estimated in Table 
2 regarding unemployment effects on the size of middle-class measured as income shares within 
predetermined quintiles of the income distribution are similar in size, sign, and significance. 
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However, there is a relevant novelty when introducing the full set of double interactions which 
is now possible. This is true when referring to HIL and column 6 in panel A and its twin estimate 
in panel B, considering only income shares within the third quintile. Here, we see that, while the 
estimates referring to recessions alone still do not present a significant association, the 
coefficients estimated for the interactions 𝐺𝑅 × 𝑅 and 𝐺𝑅 × 𝑈, show a significant and negative 
association. The results regarding the first of the two interactions as to be interpreted as if, while 
recessions in general do not seem to be negatively associated with middle-class sizes, those 
picked by the specific period referred as Great Recession, present indeed a negative and sizable 
association and are statistically significant. This, being the coefficients quite large, especially 
when considering middle-class as income shares within the second to fourth quintile of the 
income distribution. Here the coefficient (equation 6 in panel A of Table 3) of -4.19 (significant 
at 10% level) shows that a recession occurred within the 2006 and 2008 period, is associated, 
on average, to a -4.2% shrinking in middle-class size. There is a change between equation 6 in 
panel A and the one in panel B in that the latter shows a smaller effect of -1.6 (10% significant) 
but in our opinion still relevant negative association. Also, referring to equation 6 in panel B, the 
estimated coefficient for the interaction variable 𝐺𝑅 × 𝑈 is negative and significant at 5% level. 
In particular, this indicates that, while confirming the negative association of unemployment 
with measures of middle-class, this effect tends to be quite larger when focusing on 
unemployment rates during the onset of the Great Recession. Overall, results are more 
significant when considering labor income (HIL) instead of disposable household income (DHI), 
showing a regularity in the patterns observed in the baseline estimates. Moreover, also within 
the interaction-extended models, size and sign are consistent and comparable. This also shows 
that the association between unemployment and recession is particularly negative during the 
years referred to as the Great Recession, and such evidence is stronger for labor income than 
disposable income. Our evidence seems to match a diffused view that the Great Recession has 
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been positively correlated with a shrinking of the middle-class, while showing that this was not 
true for recessions in general. Support instead for the role of unemployment seems to be more 
consistent all through the different models run with and without GR interactions, showing again, 
however, that its association has been stronger during the 2006-2008 period. We then rerun 
similar regressions when using a measure of the size of the middle-class (panels C1 and C2), and 
self-reported collocations from the IVS data (panel D). 
 
4.3 Social protection and unemployment protection 
The results reported in Table 2 show that one possible mechanism through which recessions 
and unemployment affect the middle-class’ size is through the mediating effect of social 
protection institutions. While this intuition has already been anticipated in the introductory 
section of this paper, we test here for potential mediating factors from social protection 
institution. We draw upon data on social spending and finally turn to our last set of results 
extending the baseline model with another set of interactions aiming at capturing these 
mediating effects. Specifically, Table 4 runs a similar battery of tests showing two additional 
covariates obtained by interacting both the recessionary treatment with a social security dummy 
created from the distribution of total social/unemployment spending as a percentage of GDP and 
available from the OECD database. 
 
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 below show the specification of the model obtained by adding the 
𝑆𝑃50or 𝑈𝑃50dummies, and the two additional interaction effects derived from interacting social 
spending with both unemployment 𝑈  and recession 𝑅 , namely variables (𝑆𝑃50 × 𝑈)𝑖𝑡  and 
(𝑆𝑃50 × 𝑅)𝑖𝑡. 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑗
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑥𝑅) + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃50𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽5(𝑆𝑃50 × 𝑅)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑆𝑃50𝑥𝑈)𝑖𝑡 





= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑥𝑅) + 𝛽4𝑈𝑃50𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽5(𝑈𝑃50 × 𝑅)𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽6(𝑈𝑃50𝑥𝑈)𝑖𝑡 + 𝚽′𝑿 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3.2) 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the dummy 𝑆𝑃50𝑖𝑡  is constructed by setting it equal 
to one if the percentage of social spending as percentage of a country’s GDP in a specific year is 
at or above the median value of the overall dataset distribution; the same procedure is applied 
when considering unemployment spending, dummy variable 𝑈𝑃50𝑖𝑡 . Our approach is mainly 
indicated for testing larger differences which are more adequate to detect structural mediating 
effects on middle-class size, as it is likely that middle-class squeezing emerges more likely with 
persistent and structural social – and in particular unemployment - underinsurance. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Once again, we limit the display of the results to equivalised measures and considering 
only the recessive dummy. The most interesting findings, perhaps, stem from panel A2 of table 
4, where the unemployment protection dummy is used. First, the large and highly significant and 
negative association of the unemployment dummy can be read as if societies with shares of 
income (both disposable and labor) concentrated in the middle need less unemployment 
protection spending. Second, we find a significant and positive association regarding the 𝑈 ×
𝑈𝑃50  dummies, showing that the negative association between unemployment and middle-
class’ measures found throughout the paper is mitigated by unemployment spending, giving 





This paper examines the effect of employment and recessionary shocks on the size of the middle-
class across a set of definitions and measures for middle-class. Specifically, we draw from both 
income and self-perceived measures of middle-class. Overall, and by using several econometric 
specifications and middle-class definitions, we do not find a statistically significant squeezing 
effect of an unemployment shock during a recession.  However, the latter finding does not apply 
when we examine the impact of the Great Recession. Indeed, we do find a squeezing effect of the 
middle-class’ size measures based on labor income shares and during the onset of the Great 
Recession, which is regarded as an unanticipated employment shock. 
 
Moreover,  we find that the middle-class squeeze is mitigated if recessions hit at higher 
levels of unemployment. A similar effect is detected for top unemployment insurance spending 
countries, this being consistent with the expected impact of partial unemployment insurance. 
Importantly, we find also that unemployment shocks during recessions increase the share of the 
population that defines itself as ‘middle-class.’ This result suggests that an employment shock 
might increase the salience of the fragility of employment. The latter effects increase the 
likelihood of those individuals at the top end of the income distribution to view themselves as 
middle-class, given the higher threshold income for middle-class belonging. 
 
Our results show also that the middle-class size squeeze is sensitive to the definitions of 
middle-class used, but not to alternative measures of recessions when accounting for their 
length and duration. Our interpretation is that recessions exert heterogeneous effects across the 
income distribution, driving people from middle-class to the lower income groups, while at the 
same time driving people of high income towards the middle, with the overall effect of having a 
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stable percentage of people in the predefined middle-class. Our results are at least consistent 
with this explanation. 
 
Furthermore, the self-reported belonging to a social class is found to be both an inertial 
and less adaptive concept, and individuals might not update their self-perception immediately 
after an employment shock that reduces their income. The effect appears to be partially 
mediated by the effect of social protection institutions, and it was notably larger during the Great 
Recession, and when using unemployment protection instead of measures of social security at 
large. 
 
The paper has important implications for policymaking. It suggests that, if governments 
wish to attain desirable policy objectives traditionally associated with middle-class’ size – like 
innovation, democratic stability, and human capital accumulation - only income losses resulting 
from unanticipated employment shocks, such as those emerging after the Great Recession, are a 
cause of concern. This is true especially for those targeting labor income losses, more than 
overall income. In particular, we observe that such effects occurred during the Great Recession, 
and were generally accompanied by welfare spending cuts. 
 
Another significant result for policy processes is that mechanisms of income protection 
in the form of unemployment insurance seem to attain their goals of protecting individuals 
against unexpected unemployment shocks, and hence ensure both the socio-economic stability, 
and consumption smoothing of the middle-class over over time. Further studies might want to 
explore more e in depth why ‘this time was different’, i.e., why only recessions within the Great 
Recession’s wave were the ones which have been producing a squeezing effect, as our evidence 
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Table1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Variable Label N Mean SD Min Max Source 
Middle-Class Measures 
Income-based  Label       
q2to4 Dhi(Equivalised) DHIEq2to4 405 59.43 2.640 50.17 66.52 LIS 
q2to4 Hil (Equivalised) HILEq2to4 405 57.42 6.830 10.98 63.59 LIS 
q3 Dhi(Equivalised) DHIEq3 405 19.68 1.250 15.07 23.79 LIS 
q3Hil (Equivalised) HILEq3 405 19.06 2.430 3.630 23.02 LIS 
Small Size DhiEq.(Disposable 
Income) 
DHIEq (Small) 405 38.18 6.880 16.11 51.32 LIS 
Small Size Hil Eq. (Labor Income) HILEq (Small) 405 29.10 3.520 17.81 37.01 LIS 
Big Size Dhi Eq.(Disposable Income) DHIEq (Large) 405 76.65 9.780 37.27 90.67 LIS 
Big Size Hil Eq. (Labor Income) HILEq (Large) 405 66.81 7.690 35.96 84.31 LIS 
Non-income based        
Midclass Perception MCPerc 405 76.85 15.54 32.02 89.61 WVS 
Midclass Perception (2) MCPerc2 405 55.03 16.09 20.88 68.70 WVS 
Midlcass Self-Loc. in 3rd Quintile MCSL3 405 26.47 14.95 0.980 64.21 IVS 
Midlcass Self-Loc. in 2nd to 4th  
Quintile 
MCSL2to4 405 68.96 17.96 15.05 96.71 IVS 
Recession Measures 
Recession (R) R 405 0.200 0.400 0 1 OECD 
Duration DU 405 0.300 0.690 0 4 OECD 
Depth DE 405 0.210 0.430 0 2 OECD 
Unemployment U 405 8.130 4.040 1.9 24.8 OECD 
Great Recession GR 405 0.160 0.370 0 1 OECD 
Controls 
GDP PC GDP 405 10.42 0.350 9.420 11.41 OECD 
Female (%) F 405 50.99 0.530 49.85 52.52 OECD 
Population POP 405 9.440 1.320 5.970 12.56 OECD 
Age Dependency Ratio ADR 405 22.77 3.520 15.60 31.53 OECD 
Education EDU 405 74.57 12.58 31.60 94.40 WB-WDI 
Social Protection (SP) SP 404 0.780 0.410 0 1 OECD 
Unemployment Protection (UP) UP 405 0.590 0.490 0 1 OECD 
Notes on sources: LIS - Luxembourg Income Study - http://www.lisdatacenter.org/.IVS - Integrated Values Survey: obtained 
by appending observations from the European Values Study (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS); EVS - 
http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/; WVS - http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.OECD - Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development - http://stats.oecd.org/. CPDS - Comparative Political Data Set - http://www.cpds-




Table 2. Baseline results 
(A) Inequality. Middle-class and % Income within 2nd  to 4th quintile of the income distribution. From LIS database. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DEPVARS DHIRAW DHIEQ DHIPC HILRAW HILEQ HILPC MIRAW MIEQ MIPC 
U -0.16*** -0.09** -0.19*** -0.60*** -0.61*** -0.51*** 0.62*** 0.62** 0.53** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.24) (0.21) 
R 0.24 -0.11 -0.82 -1.46 -1.79 -2.28* 0.16 1.33 0.73 
 (0.54) (0.40) (0.50) (1.55) (1.43) (1.35) (1.91) (2.26) (2.05) 
U x R 0.02 0.09** 0.16*** 0.06 0.09 0.13 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) 
R-squared 0.82 0.78 0.70 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.50 
(B) Inequality. Middle-class and % Income within 3rd quintile of the income distribution. From LIS database. 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 DHIRAW DHIEQ DHIPC HILRAW HILEQ HILPC MIRAW MIEQ MIPC 
U -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.19*** 0.19*** 0.21** 0.18** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
R 0.05 -0.26 -0.15 -0.54 -0.68 -0.77 0.23 0.83 0.74 
 (0.31) (0.23) (0.24) (0.61) (0.55) (0.49) (0.63) (0.86) (0.82) 
U x R 0.02 0.06** 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
R-squared 0.78 0.77 0.73 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.62 0.51 0.55 
(C) Size. Middle-class and % population between 75% and 125% of median income (small), and 60%-250% (large). 
From LIS database. 














U 0.62*** 0.13 0.27* -0.18*** 0.38** 0.07 
 (0.16) (0.09) (0.15) (0.05) (0.19) (0.13) 
R 1.71 0.66 2.34* 0.56 1.88 1.55 
 (1.62) (0.87) (1.37) (0.42) (1.78) (1.29) 
U x R -0.25* -0.04 -0.31** -0.04 -0.16 -0.05 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.05) (0.19) (0.13) 
R-squared 0.67 0.77 0.56 0.81 0.49 0.62 
(D) Middle-Class Perception and self-reported size: From WVS and IVS. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 MCPERC. MCPERC2 MCSL3 MCSL2TO4 
U -0.31* -0.34* -0.49** -1.05*** 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.35) 
R -3.70* -5.77** -3.70** -2.29 
 (2.15) (2.79) (1.83) (2.38) 
U x R 0.54* 0.81** 0.67*** 0.64** 
 (0.30) (0.37) (0.21) (0.29) 
Observations 405 405 405 405 
R-squared 0.94 0.92 0.85 0.77 
Notes: Sample size = 405. DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income; MI = Market Income. Raw = 
Raw measure; Eq = Equivalised measure (factor used 0.5). Pc = Per capita Measure. U = Unemployment rate; R = 
recession dummy. All controls, country and year dummies included. Controls are: We also control for per capita 
GDP, demographic characteristics (population POP, the percentage of female population F, the percentage of labor 
force owning a secondary and tertiary degree concerning the overall population EDU, age dependency ratio ADR). 
MC Perc and MC perc 2 are measures of middle-class perceptions. MC perc 2 differs from MC Perc because the 
category “Lower Middle-class” from var X045 of WVS is not considered.  MC Size 3 and MC Size 2 to 4 are measures 
of the percentage of respondents self-locating in middle-class according to self-reported income deciles in WVS and 
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EVS (IVS). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Table 3. The Effect of the Great Recession 
(A) Inequality. Middle-class and % Income within 2nd to 4th quintile of the income distribution. In all cases, 
equivalised (Eq) measures are reported. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DHI2TO4 DHI2TO4 DHI2TO4 HIL2TO4 HIL2TO4 HIL2TO4 
U -0.07* -0.07* -0.10*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.61*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
R 0.62** 0.61** -0.31 0.04 0.02 -0.69 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.46) (0.75) (0.76) (1.37) 
U × R   0.11**   0.08 
   (0.05)   (0.15) 
GR × R -0.17 -0.16 0.14 -4.81** -4.78** -4.54* 
 (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (2.34) (2.32) (2.37) 
GR × U  -0.07 -0.12  -0.51** -0.55** 
  (0.08) (0.07)  (0.26) (0.25) 
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.52 0.53 0.53 
 
(B) Inequality. Middle-class and % Income within 3rd quintile of the income distribution. In all cases, equivalised 
(Eq) measures are reported. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DHI3 DHI3 DHI3 HIL3 HIL3 HIL3 
U -0.04** -0.05** -0.07*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.21*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
R 0.26* 0.26* -0.35 0.25 0.24 -0.27 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.56) 
U × R   0.07***   0.06 
   (0.03)   (0.06) 
GR × R -0.13 -0.13 0.07 -1.84** -1.83** -1.66** 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.81) (0.80) (0.81) 
GR × U  -0.02 -0.05  -0.17* -0.19** 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.09) 
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Notes: Sample size = 405. DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income; MI = Market Income. Raw = 
Raw measure; Eq = Equivalised measure (factor used 0.5). Pc = Percapita Measure. U = Unemployment rate; R = 
recession dummy. All controls, country and year dummies included. Controls are per capita GDP (PCGDP), and other 
demographic characteristics (population POP, the percentage of female population F, the percentage of labor force 
owning a secondary and tertiary degree concerning the overall population EDU, age dependency ratio ADR). MCPerc 
and MCperc2 are measures of middle-class perceptions. MCperc2 differs from MCPerc because the category “Lower 
Middle-class” from var X045 of WVS is not considered.  MCSL3 and MCSL2to4 are measures of the percentage of 
respondents self-locating in middle-class according to self-reported income deciles in WVS and EVS (IVS). Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 3 (continued).  Great Recession Effects – MC Size and Perception 
Size. Middle-class and % population between 75% and 125% of median income (small), and 60%-250% (large) 
Disposable Household Income (DHI) and Labor Household Income (HIL). Equivalised measures used. 
C1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Size - DHI (Equivalised) 
SIZE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL 
U 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.60*** 0.11 0.10 0.11 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
R -1.02 -1.01 0.59 0.15 0.16 0.39 
 (1.14) (1.14) (1.97) (0.65) (0.65) (1.09) 
GR x R 3.51** 3.52** 2.95 0.79 0.81 0.73 
 (1.62) (1.64) (1.80) (0.91) (0.91) (1.01) 
U x GR  -0.17 -0.17  -0.27** -0.27** 
  (0.22) (0.22)  (0.13) (0.13) 
U x R   -0.19   -0.03 
   (0.16)   (0.09) 
R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.77 0.77 0.77 
(C2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Size - HIL (Equivalised) 
SIZE LARGE LARGE LARGE SMALL SMALL SMALL 
U 0.18 0.16 0.25* -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.19*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
R -0.65 -0.63 1.75 0.25 0.25 0.58 
 (1.01) (1.01) (1.67) (0.33) (0.33) (0.50) 
GR x R 2.37 2.39 1.55 0.08 0.09 -0.03 
 (1.58) (1.57) (1.68) (0.63) (0.62) (0.64) 
U x GR  -0.28 -0.27  -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.19) (0.20)  (0.08) (0.08) 
U x R   -0.28*   -0.04 
   (0.15)   (0.05) 
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.81 0.81 0.81 
 (D) Middle-Class Perception and self-reported size From WVS and IVS 
(D) (1) (2) (3) (3) 
VARIABLES MCPERC MCPERC2 MCSL3 MCSL2TO4 
U -0.30* -0.32* -0.50** -1.10*** 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.22) (0.36) 
R -3.58 -6.27* -4.31** -4.13 
 (2.45) (3.23) (2.18) (2.71) 
GR x R -0.32 1.27 1.60 4.86 
 (1.22) (1.64) (1.87) (3.12) 
U x GR 0.29 0.49* -0.11 -0.57 
 (0.21) (0.27) (0.22) (0.45) 
U x R 0.53* 0.83** 0.71*** 0.74** 
 (0.31) (0.39) (0.22) (0.29) 
R-squared 0.94 0.93 0.85 0.77 
Notes: DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income.. U = Unemployment rate; R = recession dummy; GR = 
Great Recession Dummy. SP = Social protection dummy (=1 if country in top 50%). UP = Unemployment protection 
dummy (1 if country in the top 50%). All controls, country and year dummies included. DHI = Disposable Household 
Income, HIL = Labor Income.. U = Unemployment rate; R = recession dummy; GR = Great Recession Dummy.  
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Table 4. The Effect of social (SP50) And Unemployment Protection (UP50) on “Inequality” based 
measures of the middle-class. 
 
Panels A1 and A2“Inequality.” Middle-class and % Income within 2nd to 4th quintile of the income distribution. 
Equivalised measures used throughout. Panels B1 and B2“Inequality.” Middle-class and % Income within the 3rd  
quintile of the income distribution. Equivalised measures used throughout 
Social Protection 
(A1) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
QUINTILES DHI2TO4 HIL2TO4 DHI3 HIL3 
U -0.15** -0.56*** -0.07** -0.22*** 
 (0.07) (0.19) (0.03) (0.07) 
SP50 -0.18 1.85 0.14 0.72 
 (0.62) (2.06) (0.31) (0.75) 
U x SP50 0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.22) (0.03) (0.08) 
R -0.30 -5.23*** -0.75* -1.45** 
 (0.69) (1.98) (0.43) (0.71) 
U x R 0.08* 0.12 0.07** 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.06) 
SP50 x R 0.22 3.43** 0.49 0.75 
 (0.65) (1.52) (0.41) (0.56) 
R-squared 0.78 0.53 0.77 0.53 
 
Unemployment Protection 











U -0.21*** -0.78*** -0.10*** -0.30*** 
 (0.05) (0.19) (0.02) (0.07) 
UP50 -1.56*** -5.90*** -0.48** -2.29*** 
 (0.42) (1.55) (0.21) (0.55) 
U x UP50 0.18*** 0.40** 0.05** 0.17*** 
 (0.05) (0.17) (0.02) (0.06) 
R 0.48 -2.32 -0.04 -0.78 
 (0.42) (1.74) (0.24) (0.65) 
U x R 0.06 -0.05 0.06** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.06) 
UP50 x R -0.57 2.70 -0.28 0.90 
 (0.37) (1.76) (0.19) (0.62) 
R-squared 0.79 0.54 0.77 0.54 
Notes: DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income. U = Unemployment rate; R = recession dummy; 
GR = Great Recession Dummy. SP = Social protection dummy (=1 if country in top 50%). UP = Unemployment 
protection dummy (1 if country in the top 50%). All controls, country and year dummies included. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income.. U = Unemployment rate; R = 
recession dummy; GR = Great Recession Dummy. SP = Social protection dummy (=1 if country in top 50%). UP = 
Unemployment protection dummy (1 if country in the top 50%). All controls, country and year dummies included. 




Table 4 (continued) The Effect of Social (SP50) And Unemployment Protection (UP50) 
 
Panel (C1) Size. Middle-class and % population between 75% and 125% of median income (small), and 60%-250% 
(large). Disposable Household Incomes. Panel (C2) Size. Middle-class and % population between 75% and 125% of 
median income (small), and 60%-250% (large). Equivalised measures used throughout 
 
Social Protection 










U 0.72*** -0.15 0.55*** -0.21*** 
 (0.23) (0.12) (0.21) (0.07) 
SP50 3.94* 0.51 2.03 -0.53 
 (2.25) (1.11) (1.93) (0.68) 
U x SP50 -0.18 0.28** -0.33* 0.03 
 (0.21) (0.12) (0.20) (0.08) 
R 4.32** 2.18* 4.87** 1.58** 
 (1.94) (1.17) (2.03) (0.71) 
U x R -0.22 -0.07 -0.28** -0.05 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.05) 
SP50 x R -3.19* -1.56 -3.00* -1.01* 
 (1.62) (1.00) (1.64) (0.57) 
R-squared 0.68 0.78 0.56 0.81 
 
Unemployment Protection 










U 0.30** -0.14 0.15 -0.24*** 
 (0.15) (0.09) (0.16) (0.06) 
UP50 -4.40*** -4.07*** -0.81 -0.78 
 (1.47) (0.79) (1.41) (0.53) 
U x UP50 0.51*** 0.44*** 0.16 0.09 
 (0.16) (0.09) (0.15) (0.06) 
R 2.98* 1.70* 2.43* 0.59 
 (1.62) (0.88) (1.45) (0.51) 
U x R -0.35** -0.13 -0.36** -0.06 
 (0.17) (0.09) (0.15) (0.05) 
UP50 x R -0.81 -0.59 0.40 0.28 
 (1.41) (0.83) (1.40) (0.52) 
R-squared 0.68 0.78 0.56 0.81 
Notes: DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income. U = Unemployment rate; R = recession dummy; 
GR = Great Recession Dummy. SP = Social protection dummy (=1 if country in top 50%). UP = Unemployment 
protection dummy (1 if country in the top 50%). All controls, country and year dummies included. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income. U = Unemployment rate; R = 
recession dummy; GR = Great Recession Dummy. SP = Social protection dummy (=1 if country in top 50%). UP = 
Unemployment protection dummy (1 if country in the top 50%). All controls, country and year dummies included. 




Table 4 (Cont.) The Effect of Social (SP50) And Unemployment Protection (UP50) 
 
(D1) Middle-Class Perception. (D2) Middle-class Based on Self-Reported Income Quintiles 
Social Protection 
(D1) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES MCPERC MCPERC2 MCSL3 MCSL2TO4 
U 0.69** 0.51** -0.96** -1.81** 
 (0.28) (0.23) (0.45) (0.80) 
SP50 7.37*** 6.53*** -4.42 -10.29 
 (2.17) (2.19) (3.63) (6.48) 
U x SP50 -1.19*** -1.03*** 0.58 1.00 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.40) (0.66) 
R -8.77*** -12.72*** -0.04 6.94 
 (3.02) (3.90) (3.56) (6.38) 
U x R 0.70** 0.96*** 0.58*** 0.45* 
 (0.29) (0.37) (0.21) (0.26) 
SP50 x R 4.15** 6.20*** -3.19 -8.30 
 (1.78) (2.14) (3.38) (6.56) 
R-squared 0.94 0.93 0.86 0.77 
 
Unemployment Protection 
(D2) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES MCPERC MCPERC2 MCSL3 MCSL2TO4 
U -0.10 -0.13 -0.63** -1.16** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.29) (0.54) 
UP50 1.08 2.51 -6.13** -7.73** 
 (1.56) (1.92) (2.67) (3.77) 
U x UP50 -0.28 -0.32 0.36 0.39 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.27) (0.44) 
R -3.32 -5.19* -1.46 -0.35 
 (2.22) (2.83) (1.97) (2.73) 
U x R 0.66* 0.94** 0.68*** 0.63** 
 (0.33) (0.42) (0.21) (0.26) 
UP50 x R -1.83* -2.46* -3.40** -2.63 
 (1.00) (1.40) (1.73) (2.54) 
Notes: DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income. U = Unemployment rate; R = recession dummy; 
GR = Great Recession Dummy. SP = Social protection dummy (=1 if country in top 50%). UP = unemployment 
protection dummy (1 if country in the top 50%). All controls, country and year dummies included. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. DHI = Disposable Household Income, HIL = Labor Income. U = Unemployment rate; R = 
recession dummy; GR = Great Recession Dummy. SP = Social protection dummy (=1 if country in top 50%). UP = 
unemployment protection dummy (1 if country in the top 50%). All controls, country and year dummies included. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
